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VOTING TECHNOLOGY AND THE 2008 NEW HAMPSHIRE
PRIMARY*

Michael C. Herron," Walter R. Mebane, Jr.,*** & Jonathan N. Wand****

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

We address concerns that the reported vote counts of candidates running in the
2008 New Hampshire presidential primaries were affected by the vote-tabulating
technologies used across New Hampshire.
" In the Democratic primary, Hillary Clinton was more successful in
New Hampshire wards that used Accuvote optical scan vote-tabulating
technology than was Barack Obama, receiving 4.3% more of the vote
there (40.2% for Clinton versus 35.9% for Obama). In contrast, Clinton
did worse than Obama in wards that counted paper ballots by hand,
trailing by 6.1% (33.7% versus 39.8%).
* In the Republican primary, Mitt Romney trailed John McCain by 3.6%
in Accuvote wards and by 15% in wards that counted ballots by hand.
" In New Hampshire, the choice of vote-tabulating technology is made
ward by ward, and electronic technology was used in wards that typically
differ demographically and politically from wards that count ballots by
hand. Wards that selected electronic tabulation are disproportionately
from the southeast part of New Hampshire, and they tend to be more
densely populated and more affluent. Accuvote and hand count wards
have also typically produced divergent voting patterns in elections prior
to the 2008 primary. This context makes it plausible that most or all of
the observed differences between vote-tabulating technologies in the
votes candidates received reflect such background differences and not
anything inherent in the tabulation methods.
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"

Using a subset of New Hampshire wards that have similar demographic
features and voting histories but differ in their vote-tabulating technologies,
we find no significant relationship between a ward's use of vote-tabulating
technology and the votes or vote shares received by most of the leading
candidates who competed in the 2008 New Hampshire presidential primaries. Among Hillary Clinton, John Edwards, Dennis Kucinich, Barack
Obama, and Bill Richardson in the Democratic primary and among Rudy
Giuliani, Mike Huckabee, John McCain, Ron Paul, and Mitt Romney
in the Republican primary, we observe a significant difference only in
the votes counted for Edwards, and that difference is small (a deficit of
between 0.6% and 3.4% in the hand-counted votes).
" With respect to Hillary Clinton's surprise victory in the Democratic primary and the differences across vote-tabulating technologies in Clinton's
and others' votes, our results are consistent with these differences being
due entirely to the fact that New Hampshire wards that use Accuvote
optical scan machines have voters with different political preferences
than wards that use hand-counted paper ballots.
INTRODUCTION

In the immediate aftermath of the 2008 New Hampshire Democratic and
Republican presidential primaries there were widespread concerns that the reported
vote counts of candidates running in these races were affected by the technologies
used in New Hampshire to tabulate votes.' Probably the most frequently discussed
allegation asserted that a digital method of tabulating votes benefited New York
Senator Hillary Clinton at the expense of her chief competitor in the Democratic
primary, Illinois Senator Barack Obama.2 This allegation appears to be the motivating factor behind the recount that was pushed for by Ohio Congressman Dennis
Kucinich.3 As a candidate in the Democratic primary (according to pre-recount
results Kucinich received 3901 votes in the race), Kucinich was entitled under New
Hampshire election law to request a recount as long as he funded it.4 In fact, Kucinich
funded a partial Democratic recount, and a complete Republican recount was funded
by backers of Texas Congressman Ron Paul.5
See, e.g., Dan Tuohy, Kucinich Says He'll Ask for Recount, N.H. UNION LEADER

(Manchester, N.H.), Jan. 11, 2008, at A7.
2

See, e.g., Lauren R. Dorgan, Primary Votes To Be Recounted, CONCORD MONITOR

(N.H.), Jan. 12, 2008, available at 2008 WLNR 4232046.
' See id.
4 N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 660:2, 660:7 (2008).

' Dorgan, supra note 2 (noting that supporters of Congressman Ron Paul financed the
Republican recount using online donations); Press Release, William M. Gardener, Sec'y of
State of N.H., Statewide Recount of the Republican and Democratic Presidential Primaries
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Assuming that the original paper ballots are available, a recount is the only
comprehensive method for evaluating the accuracy of a given election's vote tabulations.6 However, comprehensive audits of elections remain rare even in the post-2000
presidential election period.7 We conduct here a statistical examination of reported
election returns to evaluate whether voting technology in New Hampshire affected
vote outcomes in the state's 2008 presidential primaries.
Ordinarily, our approach to election forensics would be employed as a means of
detecting election irregularities with any identified irregularity being the basis for requesting a recount, i.e., statistical analyses identify problems that necessitate auditing.8 In fact, while the New Hampshire presidential primary recounts were already
requested at the time we posted our initial findings, they were not complete and their
results had not been published at that time.9 The subsequent availability of the recount
of the New Hampshire Republican primary provides a useful benchmark against
which to evaluate the performance of the election forensic methods we demonstrate.
The allegation that there were vote-tabulating problems in the New Hampshire
Democratic primary is based on differences in candidate vote shares across voting
technologies."

These technologies are Accuvote optical scan voting (Accuvote) and

hand-counted paper ballots (PBHC)." No other technology is currently used in New

(Jan. 11,2008), availableathttp://www.sos.nh.gov/recount%20press%20release.pdf (announcing that Congressman Dennis Kucinich and presidential candidate Albert Howard satisfied
the requirements to initiate recounts of the Democratic and Republican primaries, respectively);
Recount, http://www.sos.nh.gov/recountresults.htm (last visited Nov. 30, 2008) (stating that
the Kucinich recount was stopped due to lack of funds on the morning of January 23, 2008).
6 See ANDREW W. APPEL, CTR. FOR INFO. TECH. POL'Y & DEP'T OF COMPUTER SCI.,
EFFECTIvE AUDIT POLICY FOR VOTER-VERIFIED PAPER BALLOTS IN NEW JERSEY (2007),
http://www.cs.princeton.edu/-appel/papers/appel-nj-audits.pdf.
7 Jonathan Wand, Evaluating Voting Technologies: 2004 New Hampshire Democratic
Primary 1 (Stanford University, Working Paper, 2004), available at http://wand.stanford
.edu/elections/us/NH/nh2004primary.pdf.
8 See, e.g., Henry E. Brady et al., Law and Data: The Butterfly Ballot Episode, 34 POL.
SCI. & POL. 59,62, (2001) (detailing the authors' decision to act as expert witnesses in a legal
challenge to the butterfly ballot used in Palm Beach County, Florida, in the 2000 presidential
election based on the unusually large number of votes for Pat Buchanan in Palm Beach).
9 We reported our results on the Internet on January 19, 2008, and the recounts were
not completed until at least a week later. See GOP Ballot Recount Begins as Democrat
Recount Fizzles, N.H. UNION LEADER (Manchester, N.H.), Feb. 13, 2008, at A6 (explaining
Congressman Kucinich's termination of the Democratic recount on January 24); No Change
in GOPRecount, N.H. UNION LEADER (Manchester, N.H.), Feb. 13, 2008, at C4 (relating the
completion of the Republican recount on February 12).
'0 See Dorgan, supra note 2 (relating the "unexplained disparities between handcounted ballots and machine counted ballots" that prompted Congressman Kucinich to call
for a recount).
" For the 2004 primary and general elections there were two different optical scan technologies used in New Hampshire: ACCUVOTE and Optech. Optech is no longer used in the
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Hampshire, 2 and vote totals and percentages by tabulating technology for the top five
Democratic and top five Republican candidates are listed in Table 1.13 As is evident
in the table, Clinton was more successful in New Hampshire Accuvote wards than
Obama, receiving 4.3% more of the vote there (40.2% compared to 35.9%).14 In
contrast, Clinton did worse than Obama in PBHC wards, trailing by 6.1% (33.7%
compared to 39.8%). 1"
If one uses associations like these-where one candidate does better than another
in areas with a given vote-tabulating technology-as a metric for identifying votetabulating problems, then it follows that the Republican presidential primary in New
Hampshire suffered from such problems as well. While Arizona Senator John McCain
performed better than former Massachusetts Governor Mitt Romney in both Accuvote
and PBHC wards, Romney trailed by 3.6% in wards with Accuvote machines and by
15% in PBHC wards. 16 By this logic, Accuvote machines in the Republican primary
worked to the advantage of Romney. 7

state. New Hampshire's ACCUVOTE machines are manufactured by Premier Election Systems
which was previously known as Diebold Election System. Wand, supra note 7 (discussing
the use of hand counts and Accuvote in the 2004 New Hampshire primary); see New Hampshire
Municipalities Which Use the ACCUVOTE Voting Machine, http://www.sos.nh.gov/voting
%20machines2006.htm (last visited Nov. 30, 2008) (recognizing that while many New
Hampshire municipalities use ACCUVOTE, many still count ballots by hand).
12 See New Hampshire Municipalities Which Use the ACCUVOTE Voting Machine,
supra note 11.
"3For sources used in compiling Table 1, see Presidential Primary, http://www.sos.nh
.gov/presprim2008/index.htm (last visited Nov. 30, 2008) (stating that the 2008 New
Hampshire Democratic and Republican presidential primaries were held on January 8, 2008
and providing links to official vote totals by county). Coincidentally, twenty-one candidates
participated in the 2008 New Hampshire presidential primary. See Candidates for Upcoming
Presidential Primary Election, http://www.sos.nh.gov/presprim2008/candidatesfiled.htm (last
visited Nov. 30, 2008).
14 See RealClear Pofitics, http:/www.realclearpolitics.conmepolls/2008/presidentnh/new
_hampshire.democratic-primary-194.html (last visited Nov. 30,2008); see infra p. 355 tbl.l.
"5See infra p. 355 tbl.1. A New Hampshire ward as discussed here is either a town, e.g.,
Hanover, or a subdivision, e.g., Manchester. Most towns and cities in New Hampshire are
not broken down by ward, but the more populous ones are. See Towns and Wards Districted
for Election Purposes, http://www.sos.nh.gov/electionsnew.html (follow "Voting Districts"
hyperlink; then follow 'Towns and Wards" hyperlink) (last visited Nov. 30, 2008) (listing
all towns and cities broken down into wards).
6 See RealClearPolitics, supra note 14; infra p. 355 tbl.1 (subtracting Romney's percentage
of the vote in Accuvote and PBHC wards from McCain's percentage of the vote in Accuvote
and PBHC wards yields McCain's margin of victory for the two types of voting technology).
"7Romney, when compared to McCain, performed 11.4% better in Accuvote wards than
PBHC wards. See infra p. 355 tbl. 1.

2008]

VOTING TECHNOLOGY AND THE 2008 NEW HAMPSHIRE PRIMARY

Table 1: Top Candidate Vote Totals and Percentages (Pre-Recount)

Total
Votes

Accuvote

Percent

Votes

PBHC

Percent

Votes

Percent

DemocraticPrimary

Clinton

112,606

39.4

97,388

40.2

15,218

33.7

Obama

105,004

36.8

87,066

35.9

17,938

39.8

Edwards

48,818

17.1

40,871

16.9

7,947

17.6

Richardson

13,239

4.6

10,652

4.4

2,587

5.7

3,901

1.4

3,063

1.3

838

1.9

Kucinich

Republican Primary
McCain

88,570

37.7

73,684

36.5

14,886

39.9

Romney

75,546

32.2

66,246

32.9

9,300

24.9

Huckabee

26,859

11.4

21.964

10.9

4,895

13.1

Giuliani

20,439

8.7

17,375

8.6

3,064

8.2

Paul

18,307

7.8

14,875

7.4

3,432

9.2

Notes: Candidates are listed in order of total votes, and all vote totals are pre-recount.
Edwards refers to former North Carolina Senator John Edwards; Richardson to New
Mexico Governor Bill Richardson; Romney to former Massachusetts Governor Mitt
Romney; Huckabee to Arkansas Governor Mike Huckabee; Giuliani to former New
York City Mayor Rudolph Giuliani; and Paul to Texas Congressman Ron Paul. Vote
shares are rounded and do not sum to one because not all candidates are listed.
The difference between pre-election polls and the Democratic primary outcome
(Clinton over Obama) has perhaps contributed to skepticism of the accuracy of vote
tabulations in this contest. 18 Pre-election polls were consistent in their view that
Obama, who won the previously held Iowa Caucuses, would beat Clinton by

18

See How Did Pollsters Blow It?, SEATrLE TiMES, Jan. 10, 2008, at Al.
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somewhere between 5 and 13%. 19 Depending on which pre-election poll one consults, there was perhaps a ten- to twelve-point swing between Clinton's pre-election
deficit to Obama compared to her observed electoral margin over the Illinois senator.2'
In contrast, the victory in the Republican primary of John McCain was predicted by
many, if not all, opinion polls that circulated immediately prior to the election. 2
With this set-up in mind, we investigate the claim that voting technology differentially aided Clinton, and more generally we consider whether the New Hampshire
Democratic and Republican primaries were fair in the sense of having accurate vote
tabulations. Simply put, we seek to understand whether a facet of election administration-ward choice of voting technology--can explain why a given candidate received
either many or few votes. In an ideal world, all such administrative choices would
have no effect on election outcomes or at least not systematically bias the results in
favor of any particular candidate. Thus, to the extent that we can explain differences
between Clinton's and Obama's vote counts (and similarly, between McCain's and
Romney' s vote counts) without recourse to voting technology, the more that New
Hampshire voters can trust that the election outcomes in the recent 2008 presidential
primaries were not artifacts produced by a particular method of tabulating votes.
Our objective is similar to prior efforts aimed at evaluating the effect of voting
technology and other election administration matters on vote outcomes including
studies of the 2004 New Hampshire Democratic presidential primary 22 and the 2004
presidential election in New Hampshire. 23 It is also similar to analyses of elections
across the United States. 24 The question of whether the administration of an election

19

Dan Balz, With Echoes of Clinton '92, Another 'Comeback Kid,' WASH. POST, Jan. 9,

2008, at Al; see RealClear Politics, supra note 14 (listing the most recent polling before the
election, including a Suffolk/WHDH poll showing a five-point Obama lead and a Reuters CSpan/Zogby poll showing a thirteen-point Obama lead).
20 See RealClear Politics, supra note 14, for a summary of the pre-primary polls.
21 See RealClear Politics, http://www.realclearpolitics.com/epo ls2008/president/nh/new
_hampshirejrepublican-primary-193.html (last visited Nov. 30, 2008).
22 See Wand, supra note 7.
23 See Michael C. Herron & Jonathan Wand, Assessing PartisanBias in Voting Technology:
The Case of the 2004 New Hampshire Recount, 26 ELECTORAL STUD. 247 (2007).
24 See, e.g., HENRY E. BRADY ET AL., COUNTING ALL THE VOTES: THE PERFORMANCE OF
VOTING TECHNOLOGY IN'THE UNITED STATES (2001); Stephen Ansolabehere, Voting Machines,

Race, and Equal Protection,1 ELECTION L.J. 61 (2002); Walter R. Mebane, Jr., The Wrong
Man Is President!Overvotes in the 2000 PresidentialElection in Florida,2 PERSP. ON POL.
525 (2004); Michael Tomz &Robert P. Van Houweling, How Does Voting EquipmentAffect
the Racial Gap in Voided Ballots?, 47 AM. J. POL. Sci. 46 (2003); Jonathan N. Wand et al.,
The Butterfly Did It: The Aberrant Vote for Buchanan in Palm Beach County, Florida,95
AM. POL. Sci. REv. 793 (2001).
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is without error is one that should be asked after every election,2 5 but the question
has particular salience in the 2008 New Hampshire Democratic primary because of
Clinton's surprise victory. All elections should be subject to audits, and particular
attention should be paid to elections that surprise most political observers.26
I. BACKGROUND ON NEW HAMPSHIRE WARDS

This section sets the stage for statistical matching results that follow shortly,
and here we make two points. First, we present several illustrations of the fact that
voting technology in New Hampshire is not distributed across wards independently
of ward-level political characteristics. That is, we provide several examples of the
fact that the type of voting technology used in a New Hampshire ward is related to
ward features. And second, we show that Clinton vote share varied systematically
by ward characteristics.
Note that wards are the smallest New Hampshire voting units and that each
ward chooses its own voting technology. 27 There are ten New Hampshire counties,
and no county is uniform in its use of voting technology.2" This should not be
considered surprising since county governments in New Hampshire have no role in
election administration.2 9
A. Voting Technology Across Wards
A very simple point about the distribution of voting technology across New
Hampshire wards is that, perhaps not surprisingly, counties with small numbers of
voters tend to use PBHC and counties with cities Accuvote. 3' For example, the

25 See Wand, supra note 7.
26

Id.; see, e.g., Brady et al., supra note 8 (investigating the 2000 presidential election in

Florida because of the large number of votes for Pat Buchanan).
27 N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 44:4 (2008) (allowing a city to divide into wards for the purpose
of administering elections and stating that wards are equivalent to towns for the purpose of
a presidential election); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 656:40 (2008) (permitting mayors or aldermen
to authorize the use of voting machines).
28 N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 22:1 (2008); see New Hampshire Municipalities Which Use
the ACCUVOTE Voting Machine, supra note 11 (displaying the voting technology used by
each ward); Towns and Wards Districted for Election Purposes, supra note 15 (listing every
ward's county).
29 See WIIiAM M. GARDENER ET AL., NEw HAMPSHIRE ELECTION PROCEDURE MANUAL:
2006-2007 (2007).
30 Cf. New Hampshire Municipalities Which Use the ACCUVOTE Voting Machine, supra
note 11; Presidential Primary, supra note 13 (providing the number of voters by county and
ward). These sources, considered together, show the correlation between counties with large
populations and the use of Accuvote by those counties.

WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL

[Vol. 17:351

northernmost county in New Hampshire, Coos County, contains forty-six towns that
contribute votes to statewide elections.3' Of these, forty use PBHC and only six use
Accuvote.32 In contrast, Hillsborough County, which contains Manchester, New
Hampshire's most populous city, has forty-eight wards of which thirty-four use
Accuvote. 33 The point here is that ward size is correlated with ward voting technology.
Consider Figure 1(a); Figures l(b)-l(d) are qualitatively similar. Figure 1(a)
displays smoothed densities based on ward-level Howard Dean vote shares from the
2004 Democratic presidential primary. The solid line density depicts Dean vote
share among Accuvote wards, and the dashed line density depicts Dean vote share
among PBHC wards. What is notable is that these densities differ: for example, the
modal Accuvote ward contained on the order of 20% Dean supporters while the
modal PBHC ward contained on the order of 30% to 40% Dean supporters. Explaining patterns of Dean vote share from 2004 is beyond the scope of this analysis
and in fact what ultimately motivated Dean voters to support Dean is not germane
to the exercise presented here. The point we want to make is that Dean received
disproportionately more support in PBHC wards than in Accuvote wards, and in
contrast, Figure 1(b) shows that John Kerry received disproportionately more
support in the 2004 Democratic presidential primary among Accuvote wards than
among PBHC wards.

31 See
32

Towns and Wards Districted for Election Purposes, supra note 15.

See New Hampshire Municipalities Which Use the ACCUVOTE Voting Machine,

supra note 11 (listing, inter alia,the six Coos County wards using Accuvote).
33 Cf. New Hampshire Municipalities Which Use the ACCUVOTE Voting Machine,
supra note 11 (listing thirty-four Hillsborough County wards using Accuvote out of a total
of forty-eight wards); NEW HAMPSHIRE OFFICE OF ENERGY AND PLANNING, 2007
POPULATION ESTIMATES OF NEW HAMPSHIRE CrrIES AND TowNs (2008), available at

http://www.nh.gov/oep/programs/DataCenter/Population/documents/2007-population
_estimates.pdf (showing Manchester to have the largest population of any city in New
Hampshire at 108,580); Towns and Wards Districted for Election Purposes, supranote 15
(listing the wards in Hillsborough County).
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Note: Each figure displays two smoothed densities based on ward-level variables.
Solid line densities are for Accuvote wards and dashed line densities for PBHC wards.
In this figure, "2004 Democratic Primary" refers to the 2004 Democratic presidential
primary, and "2006 Republican Primary" refers to the 2006 gubernatorial primary.
Finally, Total Governor Vote in the 2006 general election is in thousands of voters.
Figure 1: Variance Across New Hampshire Wards by Voting Technology
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Continuing with this logic, Figure 1(c) highlights differences by voting technology
in the fraction of Democratic votes cast in the 2006 Republican gubernatorial primary.
These votes are write-ins and are cast by individuals who were given Republican
ballots yet selected a Democratic candidate. 4 Whether this behavior reflects moderate
policy preferences, confused voters, voters who forgot to change party affiliations before a primary, ward-administration deficiencies, or some other factor is not known.
What we can say, though, is that whatever drives this sort of crossover voting varies
by type of ward.
Finally, Figure l(d) highlights the correlation between ward size and voting
technology that we commented on earlier when discussing Coos and Hillsborough
Counties. The Figure uses the total number of votes in the 2006 gubernatorial election
as a measure of ward size. It is clear from the two densities in the Figure that in New
Hampshire PBHC is found only in relatively small wards but that some small wards
use Accuvote.35
We note that Figure 1 contains only four variables that are correlated with voting
technology. Many more such variables exist, and we draw on the four from the Figure
plus others in our subsequent matching analysis.
B. Clinton Vote Share across Wards
We now turn to Figure 2, which presents four scatterplots analogous to the four

densities highlighted above. Each panel in the figure plots Clinton vote share
among all candidates against a ward-level variable. For instance, Figure 2(a)
(which parallels Figure 1(a)) plots Clinton vote share from 2008 against Dean vote
share from the 2004 Democratic presidential primary. The correlation between
these variables is -0.539: wards with many Dean voters in 2004 had fewer Clinton
voters in 2008.

' Such votes were not added by the New Hampshire Secretary of State to the candidates'
vote totals in the Democratic primary. See State of New Hampshire Elections Divisions, http://
www.sos.nh.gov/stateprimary2006/rgovsum.htm (last visited Nov. 30,2008) (including votes
for Democrat Lynch in the Republican primary as votes for the Republican nomination).
" See infra p. 361 fig.2(d). The largest ward using PBHC is slightly over 2000. Some
wards with fewer than 100 voters use Accuvote.
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Note: Panel labels are identical to those in Figure 1, and each panel plots Clinton
share of the total Democratic primary vote against another variable. Within each panel
a plus sign denotes a New Hampshire Accuvote ward and a square dot a PBHC ward.
Figure 2: Variance in Clinton Vote Share
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In contrast, the correlation between the 2008 Clinton vote share and the Kerry
vote share from the 2004 presidential primary is 0.579; these two vote shares are
depicted in Figure 2(b). We do not observe a notable bivariate correlation between
Clinton vote share and the Democratic vote in the 2006 Republican primary (correlation is -0.119), but we do observe a correlation of 0.239 between Clinton vote share
and the size of the governor vote in the 2006 general election. Namely, larger wards
were more pro-Clinton.
Why precisely wards that were pro-Dean in 2004 were anti-Clinton in 2008 is
beyond our scope. One could conjecture that Dean voters were anti-establishment and
that Clinton is seen, among contending Democrats, as a rather pro-establishment
figure. Regardless of whether this conjecture is true, the combination of Figures 1(a)
and 2(a) suggests a plausible explanation for a correlation between Clinton vote share
and voting technology that has nothing to do with vote-tabulating problems.

H. ESTIMATES OF VOTE-TABULATING TECHNOLOGY EFFECTS
We have now illustrated that, as of January, 2008, the distribution of voting
technology across wards in New Hampshire depends on ward characteristics.36 Any
analysis of the effect of voting technology in New Hampshire on ward-level election
outcomes will be confounded by features of wards that are correlated with both voting
technology and ward political profile.37 To estimate how much of the AccuvotePBHC difference in the candidates' votes is due to something inherent to technology,
we need a way to purge the comparison of the multitude of differences between wards
that used each technology.
To do this we use genetic matching to find a set of matched pairs of wards.38
Each pair contains one ward that used Accuvote technology and one that used PBHC,
and the two wards are similar with respect to a large set of observable characteristics
whose values were determined before the 2008 primaries.3 9 A set of matched wards
is deemed to be well-balanced and suitable for making comparisons if each observable
characteristic has the same distribution in the two types of wards. 4 Borrowing the
language of experiments, we look at PBHC as the "treatment" and Accuvote as the
"control" technology,4 ' and we investigate the effect of having PBHC technology
on the wards that had PBHC technology. This is formally described as estimating

See Wand, supra note 7, at 2.
3 See id. at 5.
38 See Jasjeet S. Sekhon, Multivariate and Propensity Score Matching Software with
36

Automated Balance Optimization: The Matching Packagefor R, J. STAT. SOFTwARE (forth-

coming) (manuscript at 3, http://papers.ssm.comsol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1009044).
31 See Wand, supra note 7, at 9.
'o See Herron & Wand, supra note 23, at 254.
4" See id. at 256 (describing a similar matching exercise).
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the Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATT).4 2 Because vote-tabulating
technology is not randomly assigned to wards, we do not expect and indeed do not
observe that there are good matches among the wards that used Accuvote for all of the
wards that used PBHC. In fact, of the 110 PBHC wards in our analysis, only twentyfour have a sufficiently good match among the wards that used Accuvote.43 In a strict
sense, our inferences about the effects of vote-tabulating technology apply only to
this subset of the wards. But these are the only wards about which we can have any
confidence that other characteristics we are able to observe-and which we know are
both imbalanced across technologies and related to the distribution of votes-are not
responsible for any differences that may appear.'
The matching method we use is one-to-one matching with replacement.45 Table 2
shows the definition of the treatment indicator variable (vs 10 = 1 for wards using
PBHC, 0 for wards using Accuvote), along with the set of variables used to estimate
the probability that each ward uses PBHC, conditional on those characteristics. This
probability is known as the estimated propensity to receive the treatment, given the
42

Alberto Abadie &Guido W. Imbens, Large Sample PropertiesofMatching Estimators

for Average Treatment Effects, 74 ECONOMETRICA 235, 239 (2006). Ideally we would also
like to estimate the effect of having Accuvote technology on the wards that had Accuvote
technology, which would allow us to draw more comprehensive conclusions about the effects
of the technology. Unfortunately there is insufficient overlap between the two types of wards
to support such an analysis. See id. at 237-38. Across New Hampshire more wards used
Accuvote technology, and their sizes and urban or suburban characters make too many of them
substantially different from the wards that used PBHC. See New Hampshire Municipalities
Which Use the ACCUVOTE Voting Machine, supra note 1I.
4" In all, 148 of New Hampshire's 323 wards used PBHC, but of the PBHC wards eighteen
recorded-zero votes in the 2008 primary, nineteen recorded zero votes in the 2006 primary,
twenty-three were missing 2006 average wage data, and twenty-six were missing poverty rate
data. Excluding the wards with zero votes or missing data leaves 110 PBHC wards. Only one
of the 175 wards that used Accuvote was excluded for these reasons (one ward is missing 2006
average wage data).
44 See Wand, supra note 7, at 9 (explaining that comparisons can only be made when all
features other than voting technology are controlled).
41 See Abadie & Imbens, supra note 42, at 240 for a discussion of matching with replacement. The relevant calls to functions in the Matching package have arguments as indicated in
the following, where Y is the vector of outcomes of interest (e.g., vote counts or vote shares
for a candidate), X is a matrix of characteristics to be matched on, and BM is a matrix of the
characteristics on which the genetic matching algorithm attempts to achieve balance. Sekhon,
supra note 38.
genout <
GenMatch(Tr=Tr,X=X, BalanceMatrix=BM, estimand="AT'", M=1,
pop.size=10000, max.generations=101, wait.generations=100,
caliper=-rep(1,ncol(X)))
Match(Y=Y, Tr=Tr, X=X, estimand="ATT", Weight.matrix=genout,
caliper=rep(1,ncol(X)))
See id.
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values of the conditioning variables.' The conditioning variables are a collection
of vote proportions, vote counts, and functions of proportions and counts from the
2004 New Hampshire presidential primary and 2006 New Hampshire gubernatorial
primary. The set of conditioning variables also includes a variable that measures one
aspect of the economic profile of each ward (the percent of persons in poverty as of
2000). We use a simple logistic regression model to compute the estimated propensities. The exact formulation for this model using the glm function of R appears at
the end of Table 2.' We match on the estimated propensity score along with a subset
of the variables used to compute the estimated propensity score.48 We set a caliper of
one standard deviation for each of the matched variables, and this means that we drop
all matches that have more than one standard deviation of discrepancy for any of these
variables. Table 3 lists the variables on which the matching algorithm seeks balance.
This set includes some additional measures of characteristics of the 2004 and 2006
primaries, some additional measures of each ward's income profile, and a measure
of the number of people living in each ward as of 2002.
Table 2: Treatment and Propensity Variables
Treatment Variable

vsl0

vote tabulating technology: 1 if PBHC, 0 if Accuvote

"Propensity" Variables

wpkerryO4pd

standardized Kerry proportion in 2004 Democratic presidential primary

wdpgov06T

standardized difference between proportion voting
Democratic in the 2006 gubernatorial primary and
Kerry's proportion in 2004 Democratic presidential
primary

PdeanO4p

Dean proportion in 2004 Democratic presidential primary

PclarkO4p

Clark proportion in 2004 Democratic presidential primary

4 See generally Paul R. Rosenbaum & Donald B. Rubin, The Central Role of the
Propensity Score in ObservationalStudiesfor CausalEffects, 70 BIOMETRIKA 41 (1983).
41 See also R DEv. CORE TEAM, R: A LANGUAGE AND ENVIRONMENT FOR STATISTICAL
COMPUTING (2008), http://cran.r-project.org/doc/manuals/refman.pdf 1. See the R Project

for Statistical Computing, http://www.r-project.org (last visited Nov. 30, 2008), for a general
description and introduction to R.
4 The variables used for matching are the estimated propensity score plus all the covariates
used to estimate the propensity score except fdp06R and f06D - f06R. These are the variables
included in the matrix X in the invocation of GenMatch.
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Plieberman04p

Lieberman proportion in 2004 Democratic presidential
primary

Pkerry04p

Kerry proportion in 2004 Democratic presidential primary

pforRinD04

proportion voting for a Republican candidate in the 2004
Democratic presidential primary

pforDinR04

proportion voting for a Democratic candidate in the 2004
Republican presidential primary

frp06D

proportion voting for a Democratic candidate in the 2006
Republican gubernatorial primary

fdp06R

proportion voting for a Republican candidate in the 2006
Democratic gubernatorial primary

f06D - f06R

difference between proportion of all voters voting in the
Democratic 2006 gubernatorial primary and proportion
voting in the Republican 2006 gubernatorial primary

povrate

percent of persons in poverty: persons are classified as
being below the poverty level by comparing their total
1999 income to an income threshold. Refer to
http://www.census.gov for more detailed information.
Source: 2000 Census SF-3

Note: The propensity variable pfit is computed as follows.
z <- glm(vsl0 - wpkerry04pd + wdpgov06T + povrate + Pdean04p + Pclark04p +
Plieberman04p + Pkerry04p + pforRinD04 + pforDinR04 + frp06D + fdp06R +
I(f06D - f06R) , family="quasibinomial")
pfit <- as.real(fitted(z))

Table 3: Variables Used to Measure Balance When Matching
wpkerry04pd

standardized Kerry proportion in 2004 Democratic
presidential primary

wdpgov06T

standardized difference between proportion voting
Democratic in the 2006 gubernatorial primary and
Kerry's proportion in 2004 Democratic presidential
primary
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Pdean04p

Dean proportion in 2004 Democratic presidential primary

PclarkO4p

Clark proportion in 2004 Democratic presidential primary

Plieberman04p

Lieberman proportion in 2004 Democratic presidential
primary

Pkerry04p

Kerry proportion in 2004 Democratic presidential primary

pforRinD04

proportion voting for a Republican candidate in the 2004
Democratic presidential primary

pforDinR04

proportion voting for a Democratic candidate in the 2004
Republican presidential primary

povrate

percent of persons in poverty: persons are classified as
being below the poverty level by comparing their total
1999 income to an income threshold. Refer to
http://www.census.gov for more detailed information.
Source: 2000 Census SF-3

pop2002e

estimated population in 2002. Source: NH Office of Energy and Planning

pfim

median family income: total income received in 1999 by
all family members fifteen years of age and older.
Source: 2000 Census SF-3

pci

per capita income in 1999. Source: 2000 Census SF-3

pballots.abs06

proportion absentee ballots in the 2006 gubernatorial primary elections

pchecklist.undl06

proportion of voters with partisanship undeclared in 2006
gubernatorial primary election

pchecklist.dem06

proportion of voters with Democratic partisanship in 2006
gubernatorial primary election

gov06T

number of votes recorded in 2006 Democratic and
Republican primaries

dpgovO6T

number of votes recorded in 2006 Democratic gubernatorial primary
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rpgov06T

number of votes recorded in 2006 Republican gubernatorial primary

f06D - f06R

difference between proportion of all voters voting in the
Democratic 2006 gubernatorial primary and proportion
voting in the Republican 2006 gubernatorial primary

fp06D

proportion voting for a Democratic candidate in either
Democratic or Republican 2006 gubernatorial primary

frp06D

proportion voting for a Democratic candidate in the 2006
Republican gubernatorial primary

fdp06R

proportion voting for a Republican candidate in the 2006
Democratic gubernatorial primary

T2004D

number of votes recorded in 2004 Democratic
presidential primary

Note: These are the variables included in the matrix BM in the invocation of
GenMatch.
Table 4 reports the mean values of several variables in the wards that used PBHC
and the wards that used Accuvote, before and after matching.49 Even though we are
not concerned with any kind of hypothesis testing at this stage, the p-value from a
t-test of the formal hypothesis of no difference between these means provides a useful
summary for how well both the mean and variance of the distributions in the respective subsets of wards correspond. Large values for these p-values do not guarantee
that the achieved level of balance is sufficient for reliable inferences about the effects
of the treatment, ° nonetheless it is noteworthy and reassuring that none of the
p-values in the matched subset of data are small.

49 These statistics were computed using the MatchBalance function in the Matching
package. Sekhon, supra note 38 (manuscript at 8).
'o See Alexis Diamond & Jasjeet S. Sekhon, Genetic Matchingfor Estimating Causal
Effects: A General MultivariateMatching Methodfor Achieving Balance in Observational
Studies 26-27 (Inst. of Governmental Stud., Working Paper No. 35, 2006); Jasjeet S. Sekhon,
Alternative Balance Metrics for Bias Reduction in Matching Methods for Causal Inference 5
(unpublished manuscript), availableat http://sekhon.berkeley.edu/papers/SekhonBalance
Metrics.pdf.
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Table 4: Balance Tests Before and After Matching
Before Matching
mean

After Matching

t-test

mean

t-test

variable

PBHC

Accuvote

p-value

PBHC

Accuvote

p-value

pfit

0.84874

0.095623

< 0.00001

0.54114

0.47607

0.13273

wpkerry04pd

3.7192

8.1903

< 0.00001

5.2914

5.567

0.18664

wdpgov06T

3.7885

5.6025

0.0019328

4.6297

4.6594

0.9542

povrate

0.064598

0.068807

0.31696

0.055721

0.053367

0.53088

PdeanO4p

0.34102

0.25129

<0.00001

0.31170

0.31363

0.82156

PclarkO4p

0.12407

0.12478

0.87565

0.12037

0.12030

0.98418

Plieberman04p

0.058903

0.086213

<0.00001

0.07099

0.073491

0.4497

Pkerry04p

0.32683

0.39369

< 0.00001

0.34959

0.35209

0.69207

pforRinD04

0.00058559 0.0013068

0.0011216

0.00050928

0.00051322 0.97256

pforDinR04

0.10735

0.12720

0.02611

0.10433

0.10146

0.7454

pop2002e

1584.4

6248.1

< 0.00001

2693.1

2984.9

0.18405

pfim

51807

57333

0.000042

55403

55680

0.89085

pci

21961

23367

0.010485

23231

23193

0.9529

pballots.abs06

0.06533

0.055516

0.026040

0.056382

0.056036

0.96201

pchecklist.undl06

0.50046

0.43456

< 0.00001

0.48623

0.47197

0.55152

pchecklist.dem06

0.20656

0.27398

< 0.00001

0.21323

0.23334

0.16148

gov06T

597.31

1910.2

<0.00001

986.5

1055.5

0.26347

dpgov06T

67.273

204.24

<0.00001

105.08

109

0.68952

rpgov06T

56.845

164.28

< 0.00001

89.125

94.958

0.61281

f06D

0.74752

0.75467

0.35224

0.75259

0.75254

0.99533

fp06D

0.59197

0.62149

0.054287

0.61254

0.6089

0.8105

fdp06R

0.0021841

0.00091978 0.36341

0.00090086

0.0012821

0.71886

frp06D

0.17569

0.14901

0.023768

0.16112

0.15386

0.43305

T2004D

303.83

1056.0

<0.00001

511

548.92

0.29725

Note: Before matching there are 110 PBHC and 174 Accuvote observations. After
matching there are 24 matched pairs. Before matching we use the two-sample t-test,
and after matching we use the paired t-test.
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In addition to the estimated average effects that using PBHC tabulation had on
the votes recorded in wards that used PBHC tabulation, we report three estimators
for the uncertainty in those estimates. We apply each estimator both to the raw vote
counts recorded for several candidates and to the proportion of the total votes cast in
the appropriate primary for each of the candidates. The candidates we focus on are
Clinton, Edwards, Kucinich, Obama, and Richardson in the Democratic primary and
Giuliani, Huckabee, Paul, Romney, and McCain in the Republican primary. Hill and
Reiter discuss the rationale for and performance of the estimation uncertainty estimators we use, 5 1 and they directly study one estimator used here, namely the HodgesLehmann aligned rank test.52 This estimator gives directly for each outcome variable

a 95% confidence interval for the average treatment effect measured on the scale of
the outcome variable.53
Our other two estimators are variations of the weighted least squares estimators
Hill and Reiter discuss.5 4 We apply the weights they define to generalized linear
models that are suitable for either counts or proportions.55 For the vote counts this is
an overdispersed Poisson model, and for the vote proportions this is an overdispersed
binomial model.5 6 One version of these estimators incorporates a regression adjustment for bias reduction: the variables we matched on are included as regressors along
with the treatment indicator variable (vsl0) and a constant (for the intercept) in either
a weighted overdispersed Poisson model (for the vote counts) or a weighted overdispersed binomial model (for the proportions) for the outcome variable in the matched
data set. 7 The estimated average treatment effect is represented as the coefficient of
the treatment indicator variable in the regression.58 If the average treatment effect
is zero, then the coefficient is zero, but it is not straightforward to translate a nonzero
coefficient into an expression of the treatment effect on the original scale of the data.
We will be content to determine whether a symmetric 95% confidence interval

S See generally Jennifer Hill & Jerome P. Reiter, IntervalEstimationfor Treatment Effects
Using Propensity Score Matching, 25 STAT. INMED. 2230 (2006).
52 Id. at 2236.

11 Id. at 2239 tbl. 1.
54 Id. at 2232.
" To define the weights, for sample size N, let cjbe the number of times observationj =
1. . Nis included in the matched sample. Let nmdenote the number of distinct observations
in the matched sample. The weight for each observation is w,= nmcl, j/'= cj. Id.
56 See infra text accompanying p. 371 tbl.5. In R, these models are estimated using the
glm functions with respectively the "quasipoissln" and "quasibinomial" family arguments. R
DEv. CORE TEAM, supra note 47, at 1049.
17 See infra pp. 371-72 tbls.5 & 6.
58 See Hill & Reiter, supra note 51, at 2233.
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contains zero.59 The other version of these estimators does not feature any bias adjustment. For this estimator the treatment indicator variable and a constant are the only
variables included in the regressions. For both of these estimators we use the sandwich estimator' to obtain the coefficients' standard errors.
Table 5 shows that all of the estimates for the effect that using PBHC tabulation
had on votes recorded in wards that used PBHC tabulation are small, and for all but
one of the effects the estimated confidence intervals suggest the effects do not differ
significantly from zero. The column labeled ATT in the table reports the point estimates for the average treatment effects. For the vote counts these estimates are on the
scale of votes, and for the vote proportions they are on the scale of the proportions.
The estimates for vote counts range from an average 30.5 vote deficit for Clinton due
to having PBHC tabulation to an average 4.8 vote gain for Richardson. These small
counts correspond to proportional effects ranging from a 2.1% deficit for Edwards due
to having PBHC tabulation up to a 2.5% gain for McCain. The Hodges-Lehmann
95 % confidence interval estimates suggest, however, that among the ten candidates
only the effects for Edwards differ significantly from zero. The upper bounds of the
Hodges-Lehmann intervals are less than zero both for Edwards's vote counts and for
his vote proportions. For the other candidates the Hodges-Lehmann intervals include
zero. The 95% confidence intervals for the coefficient of the treatment indicator
variable in the weighted regression models for vote counts mostly confirm these
inferences. All of the intervals for the bias-adjusted models include zero; this confirms the Hodges-Lehmann results for all the candidates except Edwards. The 95%
confidence intervals for the vote count models without bias adjustment show significant negative effects for both Edwards and Huckabee. The intervals for the coefficient of the treatment indicator variable in the weighted regression models for vote
proportions show significant negative effects for Edwards and significant positive
effects for both Kucinich and Richardson. In view of the small vote shares the two
latter candidates received, it is likely that the vote proportion results for these candidates stem from differences not in votes for them but in the aggregate of votes for all
the other candidates.

" Using b to denote the coefficient estimate of interest and SE(b) to denote its estimated
standard error, we compute the 95% confidence interval using b ± SE(b).
60 See Peter J. Huber, The BehaviorofMaximum LikelihoodEstimates UnderNonstandard
Conditions,1 FIFrH BERKELEY SYMP. ON MATHEMATICAL STAT. &PROBABn.TY 221 (1967);
see also R.J. CARROLL ET AL., THE SANDWICH (ROBUST COvARIANCE MATRIX) ESTIMATOR

1 (1998), http://www.stat.tamu.edu/ftp/pub/rjcarroll/sandwich.pdf.
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Table 5: Estimated Average Treatment Effects: Original (Pre-Recount)
Official Count
Vote Counts
Weighted Regressions
Hodges-Lehmann

Bias-adjusted
lower

upper

lower

Not adjusted

variable

ATT

lower

Clinton

-30.5

-72.5

19.5

-0.361

0.053

-0.304

0.067

Obama

-19.8

-59.5

16.5

-0.279

0.122

-0.260

0.080

Edwards

-24.9

-43.0

-3.5

-0.450

0.021

-0.401

upper

upper

-0.016

Kucinich

1.2

-3.5

5.0

-0.174

0.682

-0.176

0.532

Richardson

4.8

-5.5

14.5

-0.142

0.334

-0.045

0.383

-3.9

-13.5

6.0

-0.326

0.163

-0.340

0.044

-14.5

-31.5

4.0

-0.520

0.088

-0.480

-7.4

-19.5

5.0

-0.459

0.107

-0.450

0.047

Romney

-14.4

-36.5

8.0

-0.326

0.123

-0.322

0.022

McCain

-12.9

-47.0

23.0

-0.267

0.121

-0.274

0.052

Giuliani
Huckabee
Paul

-0.017

Vote Proportions
Weighted Regressions
Hodges-Lehmann
variable

ATI

Bias-adjusted

lower

upper

lower

upper

Not adjusted
lower

upper

Clinton

-0.0127

-0.0400

0.0183

-0.185

0.063

-0.156

0.085

Obama

0.0148

-0.0083

0.0419

-0.068

0.186

-0.080

0.140

Edwards

-0.0211

-0.0328

-0.0063

-0.230

-0.013

-0.219

-0.057

Kucinich

0.0022

-0.0026

0.0066

0.031

0.718

0.007

0.580

Richardson

0.0156

0.0024

0.0224

0.051

0.394

0.160

0.500

Giuliani

0.0045

-0.0078

0.0159

-0.111

0.185

-0.108

0.131

Huckabee

-0.0137

-0.0334

0.0098

-0.299

0.069

-0.268

0.039

Paul

-0.0103

-0.0263

0.0090

-0.250

0.118

-0.210

0.100

Romney

-0.0024

-0.0326

0.0281

-0.140

0.180

-0.119

0.134

McCain

0.0246

-0.0063

0.0538

-0.037

0.176

-0.014

0.161

Note: The weighted regression is an overdispersed Poisson model for the vote counts
and an overdispersed binomial model for the vote proportions. ATT point estimates
and Hodges-Lehmann confidence intervals are in vote count or vote proportion units.
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Weighted regression confidence intervals are for the coefficient of the treatment
indicator variable.
Table 6: Estimated Average Treatment Effects: Republican Recount
Vote Counts
Weighted Regressions
Hodges-Lehmann
lower

variable
Giuliani

upper

Bias-adjusted
lower

Not adjusted

upper

lower

upper
-0.019

-5.8

-14.5

3.0

-0.348

0.115

-0.370

-13.2

-29.5

3.5

-0.512

0.099

- 0.469

0.002

-8.1

-20.5

4.5

-0.466

0.108

-0.459

0.034

Romney

-14.1

-36.0

9.5

-0.327

0.123

-0.323

0.021

McCain

-14.4

-48.5

19.5

-0.276

0.118

-0.283

0.045

Huckabee
Paul

Vote Proportions
Weighted Regressions
Hodges-Lehmann

Bias-adjusted

Not adjusted

variable

ATI

lower

upper

lower

upper

lower

upper

Giuliani

0.0020

-0.0109

0.0114

-0.134

0.132

-0.142

0.064

Huckabee

-0.0121

-0.0323

0.0114

-0.291

0.082

-0.256

0.059

Paul

-0.0107

-0.0275

0.0084

-0.258

0.119

-0.218

0.090

Romney

-0.0020

-0.0324

0.0289

-0.136

0.174

-0.121

0.131

McCain

0.0221

-0.0089

0.0517

-0.048

0.168

-0.029

0.150

Vote Count Changes

Vote Proportion Changes

Hodges-Lehmann

Hodges-Lehmann

variable

AT r

lower

upper

ATT

lower

upper

Giuliani

-1.

8
1..2

-30.0

3.0

-0.0025

-0.0280

0.0053

-1.5

11.5

0.0016

-0.0020

0.0117

-0. 7

-1.5

2.0

-0.0005

-0.0011

0.0028

Romney

0..3

-1.5

1.5

0.0003

-0.0021

0.0029

McCain

-1. 5

-3.5

1.0

-0.0064

0.0010

Huckabee
Paul

-0.0025

Note: The weighted regression is an overdispersed Poisson model for the vote counts
and an overdispersed binomial model for the vote proportions. ATT point estimates
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and Hodges-Lehmann confidence intervals are in vote count or vote proportion units.
Weighted regression confidence intervals are for the coefficient of the treatment
indicator variable.
Table 6 is similar to the previous table, but it is based on Republican recount data.
As previously discussed, the Republican recount covered all of New Hampshire unlike the partial Democratic recount. 61 Results based on Republican recount figures
parallel those based on pre-recount figures.62
Table 6 also contains estimates of the effect of PBHC in wards that used PBHC
on changes between original (pre-recount) and certified (post-recount) figures. What
is apparent from this table is that the confidence intervals for the effects of PBHC on
such changes are sufficiently wide so as to make associated estimates statistically
negligible. 63 Finding otherwise, say that the effect of PBHC in PBHC wards on
Giuliani vote share was significantly positive, would have been troubling.
CONCLUSION

We find no significant relationship between a ward's use of vote-tabulating
technology and the votes or vote shares received by most of the leading candidates
who competed in the 2008 New Hampshire presidential primaries. Among Clinton,
Edwards, Kucinich, Obama, and Richardson in the Democratic primary and among
Giuliani, Huckabee, Paul, Romney, and McCain in the Republican primary, we observe a significant average effect of using PBHC technology on the wards that used
PBHC technology only in the votes counted for Edwards, and that difference is small.
The effects for Edwards also do not appear to be significant when a regressionbased bias adjustment is applied.'
Our analysis of post-recount Republican primary election returns did not uncover any systematic problems relating to vote-tabulating technology for the 2008
New Hampshire primary election, and our analysis of changes due to the recount in
Republican candidate vote counts is similarly benign. Thus, if one were to view the
conclusions we reached using the pre-recount returns as a kind of prediction that the
recount would not uncover issues associated with vote-tabulating technologies, then
that prediction would be confirmed.65
61

See Dorgan, supra note 2.

62 See No Change in GOPRecount, supra note
63 See supra p. 372 tbl.6.
65

9.

See supra p. 371 tbl.5.
This is not to say that the recount did not uncover any discrepancies. See, e.g., David

Brooks, Results Largely the Same After Recount, NASHuA TELEGRAPH, Jan. 22, 2008,
http://www.nashuatelegraph.conapps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20080122/NEWS08/572585
355&SearchID=73306340666122. Nonetheless, the discrepancies that were uncovered are
not consistent with the allegations of systematic vote-tabulating problems that motivated the
recount.
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The particular set of variables used for the matching analysis in this study does
not exhaust the range of observable ward attributes. It is possible that another set of
matching variables and matched pairs of wards would produce even better balance
among observables across technologies than we have found. It is also possible that
some observables we have not examined in this study remain imbalanced, contributing to bias in our estimates of the average treatment effects. The observable features
we have examined, however, include variables that measure many aspects of the preceding primary elections in the state, as well as many demographic features of wards
in the state.'
The biggest limitation of this study is that the matching exercise on which it is
based produced only twenty-four matched wards.67 For most of the remaining hundreds of wards in New Hampshire it is not possible to obtain a direct estimate of the
effects of vote-tabulating technology that is not confounded with known extraneous
factors.6" There are other approaches one might use for an analysis that would use
many more or perhaps all of New Hampshire's wards, but such methods depend on
strong and unverifiable assumptions about features of abstract analytical models.69
No analysis is free from assumptions, but the matching approach we use has the virtue of remaining very close to the observable data. The key assumption we need is
that the inherent relationship between the two vote-tabulating technologies is roughly
the same throughout New Hampshire. In that case, the average treatment effect we
estimate in the subset of matched wards is telling us about what is true throughout
the state.
If one suspects that either the 2008 Democratic primary or the 2008 Republican
primary election in New Hampshire was affected by irregularities, then naturally one
may believe that such irregularities are haphazard or perhaps even artfully disguised.
This study is not intended to address such suspicions. But with respect to Hillary
Clinton's surprise victory in the Democratic primary and the notable differences
across vote-tabulating technologies in Clinton's and others' levels of support, our
results are consistent with these differences being due entirely to the fact that New
Hampshire wards that use Accuvote optical scan machines typically have voters with
different political preferences than wards that use hand-counted paper ballots.

6

See Wand, supra note 7, at 9.

67 See supra p.

368 tbl.4.
6 See Wand, supra note 7, at 5.
9 See Sekhon, supra note 38.

